Native Claims in Alaska: A twenty-year review

Native Claims in Alaska: A Twenty-year Review, Steven McNabb, Etudes/Inuit/Studies, 1992, 16 (1-2):85-95. Used with permission of the publisher. [Ordering Information]

Résumé: Les revendications autochtones en Alaska — un bilan des vingt dernières années.

L'application de la Loi de 1971 qui réglait les revendications autochtones en Alaska, malgré les progrès réalisés, est encore loin d'être achevée. Des questions importantes demeurent en suspens comme les allocations de terres, l'inscription des actionnaires et la protection des activités de subsistence. Les corporations mises sur pied selon les dispositions de la Loi sont, pour plusieurs d'entre elles, dans une situation financière précaire et le fisc américain retient plusieurs centaines de millions de dollars. Certains espoirs que les autochtones d'Alaska entretenaient en matière de protection culturelle et d'autodétermination n'ont pas encore eu de suite. La résolution de ces problèmes devra probablement se faire attendre encore des années, sinon des décennies.

Despite progress in implementation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act since 1971, chronic obstacles hinder its completion. Land conveyances, enrollments of shareholders, subsistence protection and other important issues are unresolved. The financial stability of ANCSA corporations is in many cases precarious and hundreds of millions of dollars are being held in escrow by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Some expectations that Alaska Natives had for ANCSA in areas of cultural preservation and self-determination have not yet been achieved. The final resolution of these issues is probably years or decades in the future.

In his 1979 overview of Native claims in Alaska that appeared in this journal, Burch opened his analysis by noting that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 had not settled much (Burch 1979: 7). In several important respects, this observation is still valid in 1992. The historical background of ANCSA has not changed, but a new and recent history is now unfolding in ways that were not anticipated twenty years ago. Burch described native claims in terms of key features of ANCSA implementation: the capital settlement of land and cash; incorporation; enrollment of shareholders; and subsistence. There are unresolved questions today in each category. The purpose of this article is to update Burch's 1979 overview by focusing mainly on events and issues subsequent to 1979, in particular the unresolved questions to which I draw attention. These events, issues, and unresolved questions are complex, so this article can only present a general synopsis.

Although this article emphasizes the post 1979 period, it is impractical to discuss ANCSA today without addressing its earlier history. At the time ANCSA was signed into law on December 18, 1971, it required the establishment of regional Native corporations (twelve in Alaska which were incorporated by the end of 1972, and a thirteenth corporation for non-resident Alaska Natives which was incorporated in 1977), the allocation of $962.5 million to ANCSA corporations, and the conveyance of 44 million acres of land (with a base entitlement for ANCSA corporations of 38 million acres). In turn, Alaska Natives relinquished claims to 325 million acres and aboriginal hunting and fishing rights were extinguished. But even as ANCSA itself is a product of postponed decisions in the past, the implementation of ANCSA is marked by decisions that are postponed into the future.

The Treaty of Cession (1867), the Organic Act (1884), and the Statehood Act (1957) deliberately failed to resolve the issue of aboriginal land and political rights in Alaska. Indeed, the language of each law shows that government authorities acknowledged the fact that those rights had never been fully defined. In this sense, ANCSA is a result of decisions that had been deferred for a century. But ANCSA itself must be seen as an interim measure that is even now undergoing revision and which cannot be isolated from complementary and parallel laws such as the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980. ANCSA extinguished aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in section 4(b), but the ANCSA Conference Report, which accompanied the final bill to the floor and interpreted its intent for Congress, stated that Alaska Native subsistence rights would be protected. Hence, most of the impetus for the Title VIII provisions of ANILCA, which concern subsistence hunting and fishing, can be traced to ANCSA. As of 1992, the State of Alaska is not in compliance with ANILCA inasmuch as subsistence provisions compatible with ANILCA are deemed unconstitutional by the Alaska Supreme Court. This dilemma too can therefore be traced in part to ANCSA. The subsistence dilemma in Alaska is taken up in more detail later in this article. As one ANCSA corporation newsletter puts it, "It’s Important to remember that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act passed in 971 was not necessarily what the Native people wanted or expected" (NANA Corporation 1992: 7).

The 1971 law is widely and perhaps universally considered to be flawed. Within three years of its passage Alaska native leaders and ANCSA corporation officials began a process of review in order to rectify those flaws. Immediately after the passage of ANCSA, Alaska native leaders identified two important defects in the law. First, section 4 of ANCSA extinguished aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. ANILCA would later address that issue. Second, ANCSA permitted the alienation (sale) of corporation stock after 1991. In 1974 the Alaska Federation of Natives proposed that ANCSA corporations examine the alienation issue jointly, and by 1978 meetings of ANCSA officials and other Alaska native leaders were first staged in order to define and then recommend solutions to Congress. The 1987 amendments alter ANCSA so as to prohibit automatic alienability; as it stands now, ANCSA permits sale of stock shares only after sales are authorized by a majority vote of shareholders. The deadline for alienation was also extended beyond 1991, as were tax exemptions on undeveloped ANCSA lands (Morehouse 1988; Robinson, Pretes and Wuttunee 1989).

The enrollment provisions of ANCSA required that shareholders be Alaska Natives who were living when the Act was passed: December 18, 1971. This enrollment provision was widely seen to disenfranchise thousands of young Alaska Natives born after that date. Although this feature of the Act was not seen as one of the truly fundamental flaws that rank with the subsistence and alienation issues (above), during the last decade amendments to ANCSA to enfranchise those persons became an important priority among many ANCSA corporations and Alaska Native constituencies. The 1991 ANCSA amendments permit the issuance of stock shares to Alaska Natives born after December 18, 1971. As this article goes to print, three ANCSA corporations (Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, NANA Corporation, and Doyon, Ltd.) have voted to do so.

Several other technical or "housekeeping" amendments have been passed to date. According to some ANCSA officers, the early technical amendments were designed to "keep the IRS and SEC off our backs" in the pithy words of one leader. Generally, those technical amendments worked in the natives’ favor by broadening fairly narrow interpretations of tax liability, allowable deductions, and securities regulations that were decreed by federal authorities (see Burch 1979: 20-21). One key technical amendment laid the groundwork for the merger of village ANCSA corporations with their regional counterparts. Other proposed technical amendments that are being developed by ANCSA corporations now are discussed later in this article.

But the land conveyance process itself has been impeded by claims and counterclaims, litigation, the expense and time required for surveys, and bureaucratic obstacles to such an extent that conveyance is nowhere near complete even by 1992. Under the terms of ANCSA, the Secretary of the Interior can withdraw and set aside additional public lands for Native selections if the lands that were originally withdrawn by ANCSA are insufficient to satisfy the entitlements of ANCSA corporations. In practical terms, this means that if an ANCSA corporation cannot be given the land it deserves (due, for instance, to competing claims) more land can be withdrawn in order to satisfy the entitlement. As a result, the total acreage devoted to ANCSA settlement (including ANCSA corporation lands as well as public easements and other entitlements) has grown over the years (see Burch 1979: 18, where difficulties in selection and conveyance are summarized). When Burch wrote the 1979 overview, natives had received about 10 percent of the land to which they were entitled. By the end of 1982, 23 million of the 44 million acres had been interim conveyed, but only 3 million of the 44 million acres had been patented (U.S. General Accounting Office 1983: 1)¹. By the end of 1991, 10.6 million acres had been conveyed with patent, 25.1 million acres fell into interim conveyance status, but 34.9 million more acres had not yet been conveyed in any form. Hence, by 1992 the total acreage subject to ANCSA conveyance reached 70.6 million acres. About 15 percent of the acreage subject to ANCSA has been patented by 1992.

Several surveys by the U.S. General Accounting Office show that in the post-1980 period, nearly half of the ANCSA corporations lost money. Only one regional corporation has consistently reported profits. Estimates of losses for 1983 alone reach $150 million (Flanders 1989: 299). Since Alaskan economic conditions have worsened since the time of these surveys, it is unlikely that the prospects of ANCSA corporations have improved. Revenues from Prudhoe Bay operations which fund about 85 percent of the cost of State programs and capital improvements declined after 1985, and since all ANCSA corporations have invested in Alaskan businesses some of their investments are probably riskier now than in the past.

Burch's original overview outlines some of the practical difficulties that faced Natives when making land selections and establishing their corporations (Burch 1979: 18). Natives were faced with decisions about competing or incompatible uses of their land. The market values of regional resources were poorly understood by anyone, and the development of those resources, even if development were desired, posed unknown risks. The concept of private property seemed to clash with the idea of common property tenure which characterized Alaska Native society. The establishment and management of corporations sorely tested the human resources and skills of many Alaska Natives, Incorporation was a new instrument of federal-Native relationships² and some observers have questioned how compatible corporations are with prevailing modes of Native social organization (see Anders 1985, Anders and Langdon 1989, Flanders 1989, Ingram 1980, McNabb and Robbins 1985).

Be this as it may, there is a fundamental economic observation that warrants attention. The corporations could have invested their money in relatively safe, modest-yield stock and bond portfolios. If they had done so every corporation would have posted a profit. Most corporations, however, decided to go into business (Flanders 1989: 302). The new corporations were given capital, but (in contrast to business practice in general) they did not raise that capital in order to exploit a resource or a market they had already identified. As a result, some corporations tended to invest in diverse businesses that were not necessarily related. For the regional corporations, this led to the creation of industrial conglomerates with multiple divisions (Flanders 1989).

Multi-divisional corporations have real advantages, especially during times of economic growth. Different markets may be tapped by relatively independent companies, but money or manpower can be rationally allocated between and within the companies leading to joint benefits. But conglomerates usually establish a class of management specialists, or organizers, who are not involved in business operations. These managers may not need to share the objectives of the line staff who actually do the work and run the business. Conglomerates may also become hard to manage because of that cleavage between managers who are most concerned about accounting issues and business managers who are concerned about products and markets. These problems seem to have been acute for ANCSA corporations and may now become more acute inasmuch as the conglomerate structure performs poorly during economic downturns (Flanders 1989: 306). Under section 7(f) of ANCSA, only shareholders may qualify for election to a corporation board. As a result, at start-up the corporations tended to hire non-Native managers who had significant roles in influencing policy and business strategy, and contributing to the organizational cleavage noted above³.

For whatever reasons, most ANCSA corporations went into business to a greater or lesser extent. Most of those that went into business invested locally, in their region, although some diversification statewide did occur. In at least some cases, local business investments were deliberate strategies to create employment opportunities for shareholders, and as such these efforts represented human resource investments (see Anders and Langdon 1989, Gaffney 1981, McNabb and Robbins 1985). Some corporations have worked toward development of mineral and renewable resources, but this process has been impeded by conveyance problems that have already been discussed. Most regional investments have occurred in secondary sector industry, such as transportation and distribution, wholesale and retail trade, communications, banking, real estate, and construction.

Corporations raise money by leveraging themselves, either by borrowing money or by selling shares. When they sell shares (equity capital) the investor assumes the risk. When they borrow money (debt capital) the corporation assumes the risk since the loans are generally secured against corporate assets. Corporations in general usually prefer to sell shares since they seek to avoid encumbering assets that might be sold to satisfy a debt. But ANCSA corporations have not sold shares nor do many wish to. Instead, they have borrowed money. Between 1974 and 1984 the regional corporations have financed about one-third of their asset book values by debt capital, which places corporate assets in jeopardy (Robinson, Pretes and Wuttunee 1989; Wuttunee 1988). This combination of debt capital and local and statewide investments introduces significant risks for the financial stability of ANCSA corporations.

One recent study reaches a more optimistic conclusion. Between 1971 and 1991, the regional corporations made about $575 million (adjusted for inflation). Most of the revenues came from resource revenues ($363 million) from lands that were not originally open to ANCSA selection but which were made available subsequent to 1971 through new withdrawals, amendments, and negotiations. A significant share of their proceeds ($445 million) came from sales of net operating losses (NOLs) to other corporations between 1986 and 1988 (Colt 1991: 1). Sales of NOLs probably saved at least two corporations (Bering Straits and Chugach Alaska) from liquidation (Colt 1991: 13), although Chugach Alaska is now undergoing Chapter 11 reorganization and will sell key assets (timber and fish processing operations) to satisfy creditors. NOL sales provided immense benefits in some cases; Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI) sales of NOLs netted over $13,000 per shareholder. ANCSA corporation investments in marketable securities yielded about $439 million, but their investments in their businesses lost about $352 million (Colt 1991: 2). The amount of money the corporations put into the safest investments (marketable securities) has declined over time. It is important to point out that sales of NOLs are no longer permitted, and over half of all NOL proceeds are still being held in escrow by the Internal Revenue Service pending their approval.

Adjusting for inflation, the regional corporations now possess about 10 percent more than their original distribution of cash under ANCSA, which represents a yield of less than one percent above inflation (this figure does not include the book value of the marketable assets on their lands, which could be many billions of dollars.) But ANCSA corporations have provided other very real benefits that cannot be measured solely by revenues, profits, and losses. ANCSA corporation businesses provide local goods and services that improve economic quality of life, and they provide jobs for shareholders. NANA Corporation and Arctic Slope Regional Corporation employed 20 percent or more of their shareholders; however, the other corporations employed no more than 5 percent. ANCSA corporations employed about 7500 persons statewide in 1991, or about 5 percent of the private sector workforce (Colt 1991: 3, 20).

The ANCSA 1985 Study prepared by the federal government concluded that ANCSA began (but did not complete) a strategy of economic development that Alaska Natives desired and has contributed to local employment and educational opportunities, but that real improvements in standard of living and economic quality of life for Alaska Natives were limited. Those improvements that did occur were overshadowed by improvements that can be traced to impacts of government and, most importantly, oil development (U.S. Department of the Interior 1985). The implementation of ANCSA, moreover, was seen to be as complicated and confusing as the ANCSA legislation itself.

The ANCSA 1985 Study draws attention to the basic goals of ANCSA desired by Alaska Natives that have been fitfully, incompletely, or ambiguously dealt with by ANCSA legislation and implementation. Alaska Natives expected to see changes in their economic and social quality of life, rural economic development, jobs for shareholders, self-determination, preservation of lands and traditions, and protection of subsistence. The analysis has shown that some modest changes in quality of life occurred, some rural economic development was initiated, and some jobs for shareholders were generated. Self-determination, preservation of lands and traditions, and protection of subsistence may have been an indirect consequence of ANCSA in some instances, but by and large those are unfulfilled goals that are subject to as much (if not more) controversy today as they were twenty years ago.

ANCSA was essentially a real estate settlement, not a political, social, or subsistence settlement. We may be no closer to clear definitions of native political rights or rights to social services and subsistence privileges than we were when ANCSA was drafted. Berger (1985) proposes that models of traditional governance (such as IRA councils) be examined as alternatives to the corporation concept, inasmuch as institutions with a unique federal relationship that are furthermore native by definition may be better suited over the long run to advance the expectations Natives had and still have. There are numerous advocates of this type of approach in Alaska today, such as the Yupiit Nation, which are discussed elsewhere in this issue. ANCSA corporations are acutely aware of the problems that still remain and know very well that ANCSA did not and cannot ever achieve some of the dreams of their shareholders, particularly those that relate to heritage, cultural preservation, and quality of life envisioned on a broad scale. Some corporations actively promote cultural activities and have endowed programs targeted toward social and cultural goals.⁴ In other cases, allied institutions (rather than the ANCSA corporations themselves) will take the lead in pursuing these expected goals. In northwest Alaska, for example, the Northwest Arctic Borough has taken the innovative step of using zoning laws to regulate all development within the borough, placing subsistence uses at the top of all priority land uses, thus prohibiting development wherever that development could interfere with traditional hunting and fishing activities.

Implementation will not be complete until lands are conveyed, and the obstacles that have impeded the conveyance process have been summarized. Economic development of marketable resources on corporation lands cannot occur in any coherent fashion until then, so to some extent basic economic consequences of ANCSA cannot even be anticipated for years if not decades. The corporations will be unable to fully utilize their financial assets until final solutions to the revenue distribution provisions — sections 6(c), 7(i) and 7(j) of ANCSA — are achieved, and current litigation may extend this period of uncertainty for years. Hundreds of millions of dollars in NOL proceeds are still being held in escrow by the IRS, and final decisions by the IRS may dramatically affect the economic solvency of some corporations.

Several proposals for technical amendments are now being developed by ANCSA corporation officials that are designed to streamline ANCSA corporation dealings with federal agencies and to secure new withdrawals for corporations whose selections are jeopardized. For instance, some of the original selections for the Point Hope village corporation (Tigara Corporation) are on a gravel spit where the village was once located, but some of those lands are now underwater. One proposed amendment would permit new selections in this case. So in a very real sense, some of the basic economic consequences of ANCSA will not be realized until amendments are approved and signed into law, which will then authorize new conveyances, which will need to occur before economic uses of those lands are possible.

But the subsistence dilemma is now the most pressing issue for Alaska Natives that relates to ANCSA. To describe this dilemma, we must first look back to provisions of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980 and the State subsistence provision of 1978. Title VIII of ANILCA guarantees subsistence rights to rural residents (not Alaska Natives per se, in contrast to the focus of ANCSA) and requires the Federal Government to oversee activity of the State Boards of Fisheries and Game so that subsistence uses are not restricted. Furthermore, Title VIII requires that the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture advise the State as to those Boards’ effectiveness in doing their job under Title VIII. The 1978 State subsistence statute (chapter 151, section 4 SLA 1978) established a subsistence hunting and fishing priority over other uses (commercial and sport) and provided for two "tiers" of users: those (in tier one,) who could take subsistence resources when fish and game stocks were not threatened by any use pressures, and those (in tier two) who could take subsistence resources when use pressures were sufficiently high to constrain harvests by tier one users. Tier two was distinguished from tier one on the basis of local residency, customary and direct or immediate use, and the lack of availability of alternative resources.

This subsistence provision was challenged, and in 1986 the provision was re-written so as to establish a modified rural residency requirement for subsistence privileges that would qualify as a uniform law that did not unduly discriminate among Alaskan residents. This 1986 statute brought the State into compliance with ANILCA. The 1986 statute was then challenged again on the grounds that it violated several provisions of the Alaska Constitution, principally the common use and related uniform rights clauses. In fact the challenge was two-pronged: it argued that the Alaska Constitution prohibited "special privileges" for some and not others; and it argued that the rural residency requirement was biased inasmuch as it is both under-inclusive (it excludes some deserving urban residents who should merit subsistence rights) and over-inclusive (it includes some rural residents who should not merit subsistence rights). The Superior Court, to which the appellants first presented their case, ruled against the challenge, at which time the judgment was appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. On December 22, 1989, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court and remanded the case to that court, instructing it to declare that the rural preference is unconstitutional (Alaska Supreme Court 1989). At this point, Alaska law no longer complied with ANILCA, yielding the current "subsistence dilemma".

The immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court decision moved policy-makers, advocates and special-interest groups in two directions simultaneously: one, Federal agencies (in particular the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior) were forced to begin planning for an assumption of management of Federal public lands in Alaska, since the State was no longer in compliance with ANILCA; and two, Alaskan legislators and interest groups examined means to bring Alaska back into compliance with ANILCA and re-establish a State subsistence preference.

Several legislative solutions generally calling for amendments to the Alaska Constitution were proposed but none was successfully passed, and (then) Governor Cowper declined to call a special legislative session in order to seek a resolution. On July 1, 1990, the federal government assumed control over wildlife resources and subsistence on federal land. Governor Hickel established an Advisory Commission on Subsistence in January, 1991. The purpose of this body is to recommend legislative and regulatory actions to bridge the Federal and State subsistence policies (Alaska Federation of Natives 1991). The governor’s office, acting through the Commission, has proposed several plans, such as the creation of subsistence use areas and multiple levels of restriction. For example, if species were threatened commercial uses would be restricted, followed by bans on removal of the harvested resources from the use area, followed finally by restrictions among users based on a variety of eligibility factors. The Commission has also investigated the possibility of a subsistence license system. The Alaska Federation of Natives and Rural Alaska Community Action Program organized a "Subsistence Summit" in March, 1992 in order to develop an Alaska Native platform on the dilemma, which yielded a consensus position opposing Hickel’s proposals inasmuch as none of them would bring the State into compliance with ANILCA. The Alaska State Legislature failed to pass a subsistence bill by the time it adjourned on May 5th, 1992. The subsistence dilemma, a key piece of unfinished ANCSA business, is now no closer to resolution than it was ten years ago.

The implementation of ANCSA has been as complex as the original legislation, and new legislation (minimally, new amendments) will probably occur before the implementation process itself can be completed. But other pressing issues are also unresolved. Land conveyances are incomplete and additional withdrawals, trades, and negotiations will occur before ANCSA corporations are able to use their assets in a systematic manner. The incorporation vehicle itself is under scrutiny and new models of Alaska Native political and economic organization and resource management are being examined. Enrollment of shareholders is incomplete inasmuch as corporations are now able to issue stock to new shareholders. The subsistence dilemma is unresolved. Corporate assets are held in escrow now and decisions about those funds will influence the future strategies of some corporations. The economic stability and future solvency of ANCSA corporations are precarious due to historic investment strategies and the unique character of ANCSA corporations.⁵ Some expectations held by Alaska Natives for ANCSA in areas of self-determination and cultural preservation may not be met, at least by ANCSA corporations. Native rights to health, education, and other social services that were never addressed by ANCSA are still poorly defined. At the close of the 1979 overview, Burch notes that "The final outcome of the Native Claims Movement in Alaska thus lies years, and possibly decades in the future" (Burch 1979: 23). That observation is a fitting conclusion to this 1992 review.

¹An interim conveyance is a transfer of legal title of unsurveyed land that includes all reserved status lands, such as easements or rights-of-way. Patented land entails final title to land that has been surveyed. Interim conveyances can be reversed on the basis of the survey or boundary determination if a conflict with another title is detected.

²Older Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) business cooperatives may be an excep6on, but these were operated under the oversight of the Secretary of the Interior.

³Management energies have been dissipated in many ways due to conflicts over ANCSA provisions. For example, sections 6(c), 7(i) and 7(j) of ANCSA deal with distributions of corporation revenues. Disparities between resource-rich and resource-poor corporations are balanced by the distribution of 70 percent of revenues earned from timber or subsurface resources to other corporations. Ironically, losses cannot be shared, which means that corporations that take risks and make money share their profits, but if they lose money they alone absorb the loss. These provisions have resulted in litigation that has cost an estimated $35 million between 1971 and 1984 (Berger 1985; Robinson, Pretes and Wuttunee 1989).

⁴Georgianna Lincoln, "Lack of True American Indian History in Textbooks," in Authentic Alaska: Voices of Its Native Writers, Susan B. Andrew and John Creed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), pp. 91-95.Some examples include cultural and bilingual activities supported by Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, Inupiat Ilitqusiat (Spirit Movement) programs supported by NANA Corporation, and cultural programs supported by Sealaska Foundation and CIRI Foundation.

⁵For instance, the revenue distribution and alienation provisions alone make ANCSA corporations unique.

1991	AFN Newsletter, Volume 9, Number 2 (March), Anchorage, Alaska Federation of Natives.

1989	Opinion (No. 3540-December 22, 1989), Supreme Court File No. S-2732, Trial Court File No. 3AN-83-1592 Civil, Juneau.

1985	"A critical analysis of the Alaska Native Land Claims and Native corporate development", Journal of Ethnic Studies, 13(l): 1-12.

1989	"Alaska Native regional strategies", Human Organization, 48(2): 162-172.

1985	Village journey, New York: Hill and Wang.

1979	"Native claims in Alaska: An overview", Études/Inuit/Studies, 3(l): 7-30.

1991	"Financial Performance of Native regional corporations", Alaska Review of Social and Economic Conditions, 28(2): 1-24.

1989	"The Alaska Native corporation as conglomerate: The problem of profitability", Human Organization, 48(4): 299-312.

1981	Alaska Native rural development: A specific perspective and a special case, Fairbanks. Alaska Native Studies Program.

1980	Organizational development in cross-cultural management: Native regional corporations in Alaska, Ph.D. dissertation, United States International University, San Diego, California.

1985	"Native institutional responses to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Room for optimism", Journal of Ethnic Studies, 13(l): 13-28.

1988	The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1991, and Tribal Government, ISER Occasional Paper No. 19, Anchorage, University of Alaska, Institute of Social and Economic Research.

1992	The Hunter, 4(l), Anchorage, NANA Corporation.

1989	Investment strategies for northern cash windfalls: Learning from the Alaskan experience, Manuscript, Calgary, Arctic Institute of North America.

1983	Information on Alaska Native corporations, Report to the Honorable Ted Stevens, United States Senate, GAO/RCED-83-173, August 16, 1983, Washington, D.C., United States General Accounting Office.

1985	Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act —- ANCSA 1985 Study, Falls Church, VA, U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. General Accounting Office.

1988	Competing goals and policies of Alaska's Native regional corporations, Masters Thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta.

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